a. ＣＩＳの新聞出版部は、新聞問題特別担当官を任命した。その任務は、日本の新聞編集者と密接な連絡を維持し、タブＧに示されたようなイデオロギーだけではなく、客観的な編集者のコメントやニュースが報道されるように印象づけるよう努力するところにある。それは特に東條やその他の戦犯裁判における最終弁論や評決の報道と、広島計画に関するニュース記事について求められる。
b. 極東国際軍事裁判所の新聞出版連絡将校（タブＧ）は、自由な報道の任務と目的についての広報活動を継続する。これは特に東條の最終弁論と評決の段階に重点が置かれる。
c. 新聞出版部は、1948年４月に広島で予定されている献呈式典（訳注、何を指すのか不詳）に新聞課代表を派遣し、日本の新聞による正しい解釈を促すこととする。
d. 新聞発表のための適切な資料が、東條裁判と広島問題についてＧＨＱの担当の部課から要求されるであろう。これを実行することは、先述の印象に対抗するのに役立つであろう。（マッカーサー将軍の声明は大きな助けになるであろう。）
2. ラジオ
a. ＣＩＥのラジオ課は、戦犯裁判の期間中、タブＨに概説されているような、常時放送される番組で「戦争責任」のテーマを強調し続ける。また、この題目について、タブＨに概説されているような他の番組内でも常時継続して触れていくように努める。
b. 東條公判の最終弁論と評決においては、大規模な報道が行われるものとする。
c. 日本のラジオ関係者に正しい解釈を助言し指導するために、特別なＣＩＥラジオ担当者が、４月の献呈式において広島に派遣される。
3. 展示物
a. ＣＩＥ展示物課はすでに戦争犯罪裁判に関する一連の（13）ポスターの概要を用意している。これはＧＨＱの担当部局の指導承認のもと作成されるもので、それらのテーマはそれぞれ、
・なぜ戦争裁判が開催されるのか
・少人数の一団がどのようにして国家と世界を混沌に投げ入れたのか
・平均的な市民は、自分の生活を営むにあたって真の声をあげる手段を持っていなかった
・誤った情報を受け入れることの帰結
・軍艦、飛行機、弾薬に費された国富と、その影響で本来平和的目的（新しい住宅、発電所、近代化など）に投ぜられるべきでありながらそうされなかった国富について
・戦争裁判から学ぶべき教訓
などである。
4. 出版物
a. 以下のことを真剣に検討すべきである。すなわち、適格で熟慮のもと選ばれたアメリカ人の歴史家をＣＩＥの顧問とし、新しい太平洋戦争の歴史を執筆させること。内容には戦争犯罪裁判と占領の目的を含むものとする。その目的は、その原稿を日本の出版社に無償で提供し、この新しい歴史書を商業出版として販売することを許すことにある。
b. 以下のことも真剣に検討すべきである。すなわち、アメリカの主要な雑誌に広島問題の概説記事を掲載させる実現性についてである。主要なテーマは、日本の贖罪意識と、再建、平和的なあるいは文化的な動機によって進められている歩みについてである。目的は、日本人が現在の窮状（の原因）を正しく理解し、彼ら自身と彼らの国を立ち直らせようとしているのだということを、懐疑的な世界に証明してみせることにある。そのような記事が掲載されるように仕向ける方法として推奨されるのは、ワシントンＤＣ在住のボナー・Ｆ・フェラーズ准将（米陸軍、退役）と個人的に折衝することである。
c. 朝日新聞社またはその他の適当な出版社に、戦争犯罪裁判の検察側最終弁論の全文を出版させるべきである。これは朝日新聞によってすでに出版されたキーナン首席検事の陳述（タブJ-2 と J-3）を補完するものとなる。
CONFIDENTIAL
GENERAL HEADQUARTERS
SUPREME COMMANDER FOR ALLIED POWERS
Civil Information and Education Section
3 March 1948
Proposed War Guilt Information Program (Third Phase)
I. PURPOSES
1. To counter current and/or suspected attitudes on the part of certain Japanese which indicate that they are construing bombing of Hiroshima and Nagasaki as atrocities, and that American rehabilitation projects in Hiroshima should be undertaken in a spirit of atonement.
2. To interpret correctly the Tojo role and the fallacious thinking behind the growing feeling of justification for the Japanese nation's policy of aggression.
3. To help obviate the possible emergence of ultra-nationalist thinking which would, at the termination of the Occupation, negate democratic progress made during the Occupation.
II. CONSIDERATIONS BASIC TO PLANNING
1. Extreme caution is indicated on the grounds that a direct, frontal attack information program might act as a boomerang, and be the means of inciting and solidifying the majority of public opinion whereas present available documentation points to "ultra-nationalist" and "atrocity" thinking being confined to a minority.
2. The question of whether there is a conflict in policy also must be considered in relation to an all-out information program. Present policy indicates that Japan is to be re-built economically, and that a quick peace treaty is desirable. In instituting a "frontal-attack" program on these subject, the Occupation tacitly admits to the American people that the Japanese are not to be trusted and that therefore, economic assistance is debatable, and a peace treaty is undesirable.
3. It is the consensus that the Tojo trials and the Hiroshima-Nagasaki "atrocities" properly should be considered as coming under the heading of a "war guilt" program. Treatment, however, may vary in specific methods as outlined in the following plan.
III. GENERAL METHODS TO BE EMPLOYED
1. Strong emphasis on political information and education as an antidote for ultra-nationalism. (This has and is being covered to a large extent, but an even more concentrated program has been evolved and is new awaiting approval).
2. Full coverage to be given in the expose of any generate movements which show resurgence of ultra-nationalistic movements, the fallacious thinking is back of with movements, and the inevitable consequences of such movements.
3. Constant liaison with influential editors and leaders in the fields of labor, agriculture, education, government, etc., wherein the virtues of a free society versus a totalitarism state would be emphasised.
4, Encouragement of the development of progressive, liberal groups.
IV SPECIFIC METHODS AND MEDIA TO BE UTILIZED
1. The Press:
a. The Press and Publications Unit, CIS, has appointed a special press officer whose role is to maintain liaison with Japanese editors, and endeavor to impress upon them not only the ideologies espressed in Tab G, but also to attempt to encourage objective editorial comment and news coverage on the summation and verdict of the Tojo and other war criminal trials, as well as news items on Hiroshima projects.
b. The Press and Publication liaison officer at the IMTFE (Tab G), will continue informational activities on the objectives and duties of a free press, with special emphasis during the Tojo summation and verdict phases.
c. Press and Publications Unit will send a press representatives to the dedication ceremonies scheduled for April,1948 at Hiroshima to encourage correct interpretation by the Japanese press.
d. Appropriate material for news releases will be requested from interested SCAP sections on both the Tojo and Hiroshima phases, which will help to counteract impressions mentioned previously. (A statement from General MacArthur would be of great assistance).
2. Radio:
a. CIE Radio Unit will continue to stress the "war guilt" theme in regularly scheduled programs as outlined in Tab H for the duration of the war crime trials, and will continue constantly to refer to this subject in other programs as outlined in Tab H.
b. Major coverage will be given the summation and verdict of the Tojo phase of the trials.
c. A special CIE radio representative, who will counsel and guide Japanese radio people in correct interpretation, will be sent to Hiroshima for the April dedication ceremonies.
3. Exhibits:
a. CIE Exhibits Unit has already prepared in rough outline form a series (13) of posters on War Crimes Trials, subject to the approval of interested SCAP sections, with themes based on why war trials are held.... how a minority group threw the nation and the world into chaos.... the average citizen did not have a true voice in management of his own life.... consequences of accepting false informations.... moneys spent on warships, planes, ammunition in reaction to what should have been spent in peaceful pursuits, viz., new housing, power, modernizations, etc..... lessons to be learned from war trials.
4. Publications:
a. Serious consideration should be given to the feasibility of bringing to Japan, as a CIE consultant, a competent and recognized American historian to write a new history of the Pacific War, which would include War Crimes Trials and Occupation objectives. The purpose would be to turn the manuscript over to a Japanese publisher, without cost, and permit him to publish this new history as a commercial venture.
b. Serious consideration should also be given to the possibility of an article being published in a leading American magazine covering a recapitulation of Hiroshima, the main theme of which would be Japanese atonement and the steps being taken in reconstruction, peaceful, cultural motivities, etc., to prove to a skeptial world that the Japanese are aware of the senses of their present plight and are trying to help themselves and their nation. A suggested method of inspiring such an article would be to make private arrangements with Brig. Gen. Bonner F. Feller(s) (USA, Ret.) now in Washington, D.C.
c. Encouragement will be given to Asahi Shimbun or another likely publisher to publish the entire text of the Prosecution's summation at the War Crimes Tribunal, to augment Chief Counsel Keenan's statement already being published by Asahi (Tab J-2 and J-3).
